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A EUROPEAN VIEW 
The Corporate Board in Transition, 
by B O H D A N H A W R Y L Y S H Y N / Director, CEI (International Management Institute), Geneva 
Boards of directors used to be peaceful corporate sanctuaries. Their importance, their intensity 
of involvement varied across compa-
nies and countries. Some were 
merely ornaments at the top of the 
corporate structure; others exercised 
the ultimate powers of decision in all 
key areas of corporate life. Some 
boards met to have a good lunch, 
exchange business gossip, and 
perform the necessary legal formality 
of approving what had already taken 
place. Others met frequently, scru-
tinized voluminous reports and 
proposals, and made decisions that 
determined the future health and 
performance of the corporation. In 
most cases, the boards felt secure 
and unchallenged, both in their 
status as the supreme governing 
organ of the corporation and in their 
right to perpetuate themselves. 
In the seventies, all boards came 
under pressure, as a number of 
factors converged. After several 
decades of expansion, successful 
innovations, and profits, many 
corporations had to jam on the 
brakes and adjust to a leaner fife. But 
society's expectations, which had 
matured in the heydays of growth. 
could no longer be nourished easily. 
Workers expected increasing 
wages, job security, improved 
working conditions, and more say in 
management. Customers began to 
compare advertised promises against 
the performance of products—and 
grumbling increased. Communities 
whose very existence depended on 
corporate decisions wanted to be 
counted in. Home country govern-
ments, under pressure of inflation, 
unemployment, budget, and balance 
of payments deficits, demanded 
greater corporate compliance with 
their policies. 
Host country governments wanted 
the subsidiaries of foreign corpora-
tions to march more to the tune of 
their national objectives and less 
to the rhythm of foreign-based 
corporate headquarters. Caught 
between market downturns and 
rising constituency demands, some 
corporations could not adjust and 
went off the rails. Others, in their 
anxiety to continue to perform well, 
resorted to such expedients as 
swapping corporate favors or 
greasing wi l l ing hands. News, 
spreading quickly, was often blown 
out of proport ion; and the boards, as 
the bodies ultimately responsible, 
frequently looked pale under such 
circumstances: not sufficiently 
informed, not sufficiently knowl-
edgeable, or not sufficiently assertive. 
It is against the above background 
that I shall review the nature and 
direction of changes in boards—both 
changes that have taken place and 
those which are necessary or likely. 
My approach grew from a discus-
sion with former colleague Dr. i.|. 
O'Connell, then a CEI faculty mem-
ber who carried out research on 
boards in six European countries; he 
is now professor and dean of the 
Graduate School, Bentley College, 
Waltham, Mass. 
Responsibilities 
Boards first emerged as a group of 
owners or as direct nominees of the 
owners to whom they owed their 
sole responsibility. Board members 
were the custodians, protecting 
property, preserving assets. The 
responsibility was discharged by 
appointed managers, whose achieve-
ments were summarized in an annual 
report and presented to the assembly 
of owners. This was the pure share-
holder era of corporate life. 
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With time, ownership spread and 
became diluted. Shareholders grew 
numerous, buying and selling at will 
their piece of ownership Most of 
them were known only to the 
company computer Thus, the links 
between the owners and their repre-
sentatives on the boards became 
fragile. And as corporations, having 
become big and potent, took on lives 
of their own, their perpetuation 
became more important than the 
maximization of dividends or share 
prices. The boards gradually shifted 
their commitment to the corporation 
itself and away from its owners, the 
shareholders. Legally things did not 
change; the instruments remained. 
There were still annual reports and 
the annual shareholder assemblies 
with their proxy mechanism that 
facilitated the self-perpetuation of 
the boards. 
Recently, new claimants, who 
represent more organized constituen-
cies, have begun to appeal to the 
media, to the general public, and to 
governments. Whi le their nature and 
power vary, the labor constituencies 
have been quite significant. In such 
countries as Germany or the Scandi-
navian nations, powerful unions have 
obtained the right for employees to 
be represented on boards. I he ratio-
nale is thai workers, who wi l l often 
stay with an enterprise throughout 
their working lives, are more affected 
by board decisions—and thus have 
a greater stake in them—than are 
anonymous shareholders who unload 
their shares at the slightest negative 
signal from the stock market. In some 
cases, where the very survival of a 
community depends on board de-
cisions to expand or close down an 
operation, local authorities also feel 
that they have a critical stake in 
corporate affairs and therefore 
should have a say through boardroom 
representation (e.g., Gothenburg 
and Volvo's operation located there.) 
In the U.S., minorities, feeling that 
they supply much labor but are not 
asked for many ideas, have aspired 
for board representation. Consumers, 
for example, having been told that 
they are ultimate decision makers 
because they vote with their dollars, 
have learned that such voting does 
not always result in better, safer, or 
cheaper products The promise of a 
more direct vote in the boardroom 
has seemed an attractive alternative. 
Thus, the stakeholder era has been 
born. This is the newest corporate 
incarnation. If we accept the notion 
of board responsibility to stake-
holders rather than just to share-
holders, what is the nature of that 
responsibility? Clearly, the interests of 
different constituencies vary and 
sometimes even clash, such as higher 
wages versus cheaper products. So 
one responsibility of boards must be 
to reconcile such interests. To achieve 
this, the various stakeholder repre-
sentatives must accept the fact that 
their primary responsibility is to facil-
itate the effective functioning of 
the corporation. They cannot be 
spokesmen acting within the narrow 
mandate of their constituencies; 
rather, they must function with the 
understanding that, while taking into 
account the interests of their constit-
uency, they wi l l seek to make those 
interests compatible with the basic 
requirements of corporate health; 
innovation, ethical behavior, profita-
bility. Philosophically, the Dutch have 
advanced the furthest along this line, 
establishing the balance between 
conscience and constituency; each 
board member must act for the good 
of the corporation according to his 
good conscience, taking into account 
his constituency's interests while not 
being a mere spokesman for them. 
If one accepts the stakeholder 
concept, then new instruments and 
new institutional interfaces are 
required for the board to fulfi l l its 
responsibilities to these various 
stakeholders. Annual reports, which 
used to focus on sales, operations, 
and financial aspects, wil l now have 
to be addressed—as is often the case 
already—to different constituencies 
with different content. Workers' 
councils, meeting with relevant 
public authorities, may be as neces-
sary as present encounters with 
financial analysts. 
Roles 
As responsibilities change, so must 
the roles of the boards, the things 
they actually do. When the responsi-
bilities were mainly of a custodial 
nature, the main tasks of boards 
were verification of results, hiring, 
rewarding, or sanctioning senior 
managers. 
As enterprises grow in size and 
complexity, there is a shift of loyalty 
and commitment away from owners 
and toward the corporation itself. 
This has involved the boards more in 
the decisions about future actions. 
However, given the professionaliza-
tion of management, only the inside 
board members tended at first to 
initiate decisions. The outsiders 
provided information about markets, 
suppliers, sources of credit; they gave 
some advice and "ratif ied" decisions 
submitted for formal approval by 
management. Since those in execu-
tive positions controlled inside infor-
mation and had more directly 
relevant expertise, they assumed 
more power and boards became their 
captives. This was facilitated by the 
practice common in North America 
of the chairman also being the chief 
executive officer. 
With loss of management control 
in some large corporations, with 
unethical behavior in others, and 
with board members disclaiming 
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responsibility in many such 
instances, pressure emerged to 
review the duties of boards. It 
seemed advisable to separate direc-
tion, supervision,and evaluation from 
the actual implementation of 
decisions. Thus, the board would 
define the mission and objectives of 
a corporation, establish policies, 
monitor their implementation, 
evaluate the performance of the 
corporation —including that of the 
chief executive officer -arid, ideally, 
assess its own performance. But to 
carry out such an evaluation effec-
tively the roles of the chairman and 
CEO must obviously be separated. It 
is diff icult to preside over one's own 
judgment, particularly when it is 
carried out by one's subordinates. 
The Structure 
Boards were created originally as 
single entities and long tended to 
operate as such. When greater 
pressure was placed on performance, 
special committees evolved, such as 
executive, personnel, and com-
pensation Then, regulatory bodies 
demanded the creation of audit 
committees to ascertain greater 
accountability. 
Some countries, such as Germany, 
went further. They imposed by law 
two-tier boards, one supervisory and 
one management. I he Germans felt 
that this would automatically 
separate direction and evaluation 
from implementation, making boards 
more independent of management 
and therefore more accountable. 
Elsewhere, as in Sweden, there is only 
one board; but since only the 
managing director in corporate 
management can sit on the board, 
and he does not act as its chairman, 
there is an approximation of the 
German practice. In North America, 
the trend is in the same direction. 
There is a rapid shift toward 
appointing a majority of outside 
members and separating the roles of 
chairman and CEO, a recent case 
being that of IBM, Such a shift 
towards de facto, two-tier boards wil l 
be further accelerated because such a 
structure can accommodate more 
readily the various stakeholder repre-
sentatives on the boards, without 
impeding the functioning of the 
corporation. 
Composition 
Once the owners, or "their" men, 
would sit on the boards. When the 
boards were pulled into the decision-
making process, "management's" 
buddies often were invited to join 
the board. The process of accession 
shifted from one of appointment to 
that of co-optation by the boards. 
Since boards wil l now be more 
representative in order to legitimize 
the corporation vis-a-vis its various 
constituencies, the trend is bound to 
be toward stakeholder representa-
tives getting on boards through a 
more genuinely elective process The 
two-tier boards, or their equivalent, 
wi l l become the general pattern in 
order to accommodate this. This 
supervisory board without executive 
members wil l meet less frequently, 
decide on major investments, make 
dispositions of profits, and appoint 
top executives. This wil l , in turn, keep 
the board out of the implementation 
function and reduce the potential 
area of conflict between constitu-
ency representatives. 
Boards must not only be indepen-
dent in order to be accountable and 
credible, they must also be compe-
tent, or they wil l not give proper 
direction to corporate activities. Two-
tier boards assure independence, but 
they do not guarantee competence, 
which requires knowledge of markets, 
products, technology, industry struc-
ture, competit ion, and trade patterns. 
These requirements imply effort and 
time, and anyone who sits on a board 
wil l thus need to reduce his board 
memberships in order to commit 
more time to each individual board. 
In the long run, it probably means 
professional outside board members. 
To create such a pool, earlier retire-
ment by top executives may be desir-
able. 
Conclusions 
Like any organism, a board consists 
of several components which have to 
be compatible When one compo-
nent changes, the other must follow. 
Corporations function in social/poli t-
ical contexts which, as they evolve, 
place new demands on corporations. 
As the corporation's supreme 
governing body, the board must 
respond to such demands, accepting 
new responsibilities. As responsibili-
ties change, so must the roles, the 
structure, and the composit ion of 
boards. Only the harmonious evolu-
tion of all of these aspects can assure 
both greater acceptability of and 
smooth functioning by boards. Token 
minority representation or audit 
committee location wi l l not suffice. 
After examining the experience of 
various countries, one can deduce 
the general direction of change: 
• Increased board responsibilities 
to sectors of the population affected 
by the activities of the corporation. 
• Sharper segregation of direction, 
monitoring, and evaluation imple-
mentation. 
• A more truly elective process 
• A two-tier structure or its equiva-
lent. 
• Separation of the duties of the 
chairman of the board and the chief 
executive officer. 
Individual countries and compa-
nies may move at a different pace, 
but they are likely to move in these 
general directions. £ 
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